This paper investigates whether the presence of ambitious entrepreneurs is a more important determinant of national economic growth than entrepreneurial activity in general. We use data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor to test the extent to which high growth ambitions of entrepreneurs affect GDP growth for a sample of 36 countries. Our results suggest that ambitious entrepreneurship contributes more strongly to macro-economic growth than entrepreneurial activity in general. We find a particularly strong effect of high-expectation entrepreneurship for transition countries. These results are interpreted in light of the ongoing debate about public policies designed to stimulate high growth start-ups. JEL-classification: L16, L21, M13, O11, O40, O57
Introduction
Entrepreneurship is considered a crucial mechanism of economic development (Schumpeter 1934; Wennekers and Thurik 1999; Baumol 2002 ; Van Stel et al. 2005) . The centrality of entrepreneurship in the current economy, or even society, is expressed as such in scientific and policy discourses as 'the entrepreneurial economy' (Audretsch and Thurik 2000) and 'the entrepreneurial society' (Ministerie van Economische Zaken 1999a; Von .
At the macro level entrepreneurship is seen as a driver of structural change and job creation.
At the micro level entrepreneurship is the engine behind the formation and subsequent growth of new firms. However, there has been mixed evidence on the effect of entrepreneurship in general on economic growth (Audretsch and Fritsch, 2002 ; Van Stel and Storey, 2004) . It has been said that in order to promote economic development, policy makers should focus on high-growth firms instead of new -often very small -firms in general (Friar and Meyer 2003) . This seems to be confirmed in empirical research: more consistent positive evidence has been made for the effect of high-potential start-ups (Wong et al. 2005 ) and fastgrowing firms (Mason 1985; Kemp et al. 2000) on economic growth. With regard to job creation it is not new firms per se that are the key, but the relatively small number of fastgrowing 'gazelles' that make up the lion's share of jobs in new firms (Birch 1979; Gallagher and Miller 1991; Kirchhoff 1994; Storey 1997; Schreyer 2000; Buss 2002 ). In addition, these high-growth firms are characterized by rising labour productivity at the same time as they are generating jobs (Verhoeven et al. 2002; Littunen and Tohmo 2003) . Nurturing high growth firms, or "gazelles", has become a primary target and ultimate goal of entrepreneurship policy . As a result these high growth firms are high on the agenda of regional (Fischer and Reuber 2003) , national (Smallbone et al. 2002) , and supra-national policy makers (European Commission 2003b) . In this paper we will investigate whether the presence of ambitious entrepreneurs -regarding expected firm growth -is a more important determinant of national economic growth than entrepreneurial activity in general. This is not straightforward as the ambitions of these entrepreneurs are yet to be realised at the time these ambitions are expressed.
The paper is structured as follows. We will start with a review of the literature on growth ambitions of entrepreneurs and high-growth firms. Next, we will discuss public policy aimed at high-growth firms in general (Section 3) and in the United States and the Netherlands in particular (Section 4). In the empirical part of the paper we will present the data and research method used in Section 5, while we will present our empirical analysis of
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the association of the presence of ambitious entrepreneurs and national economic growth in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the outcomes and concludes.
Growth ambitions and high growth firms
It has been argued that entrepreneurship is not about self-employment or new firm formation per se, as most of the persons involved in this do not have an ambition to grow (Henrekson 2005) . Growth motivation is a necessary factor for actual firm growth. Such growth motivation is determined by the perceived ability, need and opportunity for growth (Davidsson 1989) . Although some objective factors directly affect actual growth, the entrepreneur's perception of the ability, need and opportunity for growth is of major importance for explaining motivation-mediated effects on growth.
There have been several studies on the determinants of growth intentions of (nascent) entrepreneurs (Davidsson 1989; Wiklund 2001; Welter 2001) . These studies found that growth intentions are positively associated with gender (male), age (young), entrepreneurial experience, and experience as informal investor (Welter 2001; De Clercq et al. 2003) .
Perhaps more interesting for the present paper are studies on the consequences of growth intentions. In general, the growth intentions of entrepreneurs are found to be positively related to subsequent firm growth (Bellu and Sherman 1995; Kolvereid and Bullvåg 1996; Miner et al. 1994; Mok and van den Tillaart 1990; Wiklund and Shepherd 2003) . However, this statistical relation between growth intentions and growth realizations tends to be rather weak. It is likely that the effect of growth intentions is moderated by the access to resources and the availability of opportunities. Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) showed that the effect of growth motivation on realized growth is moderated by the level of education and experience of the entrepreneur as well as the dynamism of the environment in which the firm operates: education, experience and environmental dynamism magnify the effect an entrepreneur's growth motivation has on the realization of firm growth. Or, to put it more strongly: in order to grow a new business, growth intentions, resources, and opportunities are necessary conditions. In practice, it remains very hard to identify high-growth firms in advance. Recent research found some tendencies: for example opportunity based entrepreneurship, the availability of a large information set, and a spatially broad market orientation in the start-up phase distinguishes entrepreneurs of future high growth firms from entrepreneurs of low growth firms (Vivarelli 2004; Stam and Schutjens 2005; Smallbone et al. 2002) .
These insights on the role of growth ambitions of entrepreneurs and initial conditions of high growth start-ups have important policy implications. It is imperative that general Jena Economic Research Paper 2007-019 policy measures are so designed that only those who react in the intended way are rewarded.
If the self-employed with relatively low ambitions get the benefits, reactions that run counter to the intentions of the policy are not unlikely. Subsidizing entrepreneurs and new firms in general might bring about a major bias in the process of market selection. This could include substitution as well as deadweight effects (Santarelli and Vivarelli 2002; Vivarelli 2004) . A deadweight effect refers to the situation in which less efficient or less ambitious entrepreneurs are given subsidies, and remain in the market as long as they can use the subsidy; these entrepreneurs do not need such subsidies for improving their business. A substitution effect arises when less efficient entrepreneurs are given an artificial seedbed, while market competition would have induced them to leave the market. These effects advocate a policy oriented towards ambitious entrepreneurs. This is discussed in the next section.
Public policy aimed at high growth start-ups
Due to the important economic, social, and political roles new and small firms play in most economies, governments at all levels -federal, state/regional, and local -have designed strategies to support entrepreneurial activity. One of the most important questions regarding entrepreneurship policy is whether to stimulate new firm formation, to help existing firms survive, or to focus on (potentially) growing firms (cf. Reynolds et al. 1994) . Next, it is also important to decide on whether to aim for generic policy, or to focus on particular regions or industries (cf. Stam 2005) . Of course prior to any public policy should be the establishment of a legal framework, a "rule of law" (cf. De Soto 2001) . This legal foundation is often taken for granted, but is often not in place in developing and transition countries. Perhaps the first question must be whether governments should be involved in supporting entrepreneurs at all.
Why should governments do more than enhancing the general investment climate? So-called market failures are often used to legitimise entrepreneurship policy (Storey 2003; 2006) . In the specific context of public policy aimed at (potential) high-growth firms, especially information imperfections and externalities may be important reasons for policy interventions.
With regard to information imperfections, entrepreneurs might have too negative expectations concerning the consequences of growth, and they might not realise the private benefits of obtaining expert advice from "outside" specialists. There might also be significant information imperfections at the side of financial institutions, which are unable to assess the Jena Economic Research Paper 2007-019 viability and growth potential of new firms, and (on balance) overestimate the risk of lending to entrepreneurs of (potential) high growth firms.
Positive externalities may be present when social returns of certain economic activities exceed private returns. Entrepreneurs may not undertake projects which, whilst in the interest of society as a whole, yield the firm insufficient returns. The role of public policy (e.g. subsidy) is to make it privately worthwhile for the firm to undertake the project, enabling society as a whole to benefit. In the context of high growth firms, it might be that entrepreneurs do not pursue certain projects, because the risks are too high (new technology), or because they cannot fully appropriate the returns (innovation). Public policy could raise the private benefits of these projects in order to produce the social benefits, e.g. job creation and improved national productivity. The arguments against targeting (potential) high-growth firms are (Bridge et al. 2003: 293-295 ):
1-Selecting potential high-growth firms is too difficult. 1 2-Venture capitalist are able to pick winners, with the inclusion of a considerable number of potential winners that turned out to be losers (cf. Baum and Silverman 2004) , while public policy would seek to back all the winners and avoid any losers.
3-Start-ups in general deserve policy support, due to their seedbed function, unequal access to finance and information, their employment creation (still most of the jobs in the small business sector come from non high-growth firms), and their effect on regional prosperity in the long run (see also Fritsch and Mueller 2004; Van Stel and Suddle, 2006) . 4-What is needed is an enterprising culture that has effect on all layers of society: new firms, small firms, large firms, public organizations.
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However, there are at least as many arguments in favour of targeting (potential) high growth firms (Bridge et al. 2003: 292-293): 1-Targeting increases the effectiveness and efficiency of support measures. Focusing resources on a small group of ambitious entrepreneurs -i.e. where they are most needed and where they can produce the best results -is more effective than more generalised support. By applying support only to growth firms, the total requirements, and its cost, are reduced. This increases efficiency as a sufficient impact is made with limited resources.
2-It provides a clearer strategic focus on the needs of high growth businesses; high levels of expertise are more likely to be developed both in the public sector as well as in the related support fields (such as venture capitalists, bankers, and consultants).
3-More start-ups are not needed. In many European countries the number of start-ups has already increased enormously in the last two decades (Bosma and Wennekers, 2003) .
4-Supporting start-ups distorts the market mechanism.
In the next section we will focus on how public policy aimed at high growth firms is formulated in two particular countries, the United States (as a 'role model' country with respect to high growth firms policies) and the Netherlands (the home country of the authors).
Public policy aimed at high growth firms in the United States and the Netherlands
Public policy has played a major role in the high number of high-growth start-ups in the US . A mix of public policies, often unintentionally, have had a profound influence on the creation of a US entrepreneurial economy. Four key areas can be distinguished (Von Bargen et al. 2003, 316-319; cf. Chesbrough 1999 As a legacy of the cold war, federal policy has been stimulating the expansion of science and engineering expertise for a long time. This has been boosted by liberal immigration policies, that allowed large numbers of technically trained immigrants to join or even initiate entrepreneurial efforts (see Saxenian 2002) . Next to these policy efforts to increase the number of technical talents, high-growth entrepreneurship is facilitated by policy that creates flexible labour markets (see Chesbrough 1999) .
Finally, the huge internal market -enabled by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), completed in 1964 -allows entrepreneurs to do business in an enormous home-market. Next
to this large open (territorial) market, government intervention to deregulate leading industries -like the airline industry, the package delivery industry, the trucking industry, and the telecommunications industry -in the 1980s has had a large impact on high growth opportunities.
Public policy aimed at high-growth firms is often legitimized by an unfavorable ranking in international hitlists of (potentially) fast-growing firms. This is also the case in the Netherlands, (EFER 1998; Ministerie van Economische Zaken 1999b; Ehrhardt et al. 2004 ).
In the yearly international Adult Population Survey of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) entrepreneurs are being asked whether they expect to employ 20 employees or more
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within five years after the start of their firm. In the Netherlands the share of potential high growth (early-stage) entrepreneurs in the adult population in 2005 is 0.26%. This is rather low in comparison with the average of the OECD-countries participating in GEM: 0.61%. In a European context, 0.47% expects to employ 20 or more employees within five years after the start of their firm. Countries that are much more entrepreneurial, like the US and NewZealand, have a share of potential fast growers of respectively 1.41% and 1.42% (Autio 2005) . As long as the Netherlands keeps lagging behind the other benchmark countries, much more policy efforts are said to be needed in order to improve this 'backward' situation. In order to stimulate growth ambitions in the Netherlands, the government has studied high growth firms and the specific additional bottlenecks that these firms experience in comparison with regular start-ups. Peeters and Verhoeven (2005) report that the group of high growth firms in the Netherlands is relatively small (9%), compared to the average of the European countries (15%).
2 Specifically, three major bottlenecks for high growth firms Unfortunately, policy interventions to stimulate high-growth firms are hardly evaluated. This makes it hard to derive normative implications from this overview of public policy aimed at high growth firms. The least we can do is investigating whether the prevalence of ambitious entrepreneurs has an effect on national economic growth at all. In the next sections we will present empirical evidence on this issue.
Data and research method
It is generally acknowledged that there are differences in the distribution of entrepreneurship across countries. Studies exploring differences in entrepreneurship across countries often focus on the incidence of new firm registration or self-employment, which may not be reliable indicators when applied to transition and developing countries with significant informal economies and fewer alternatives to self-employment. For these reasons we have used the Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) indicator, defined as the percentage of adult population that is either actively involved in starting a new venture or is the owner/manager of a business that is less than 42 months old. In the current study we investigate whether the presence of ambitious entrepreneurs is a more important determinant of national economic growth than entrepreneurial activity in general. Our empirical analysis builds on Van Stelet al. (2005) . They investigate whether TEA influences GDP growth for a sample of 36 countries. The authors find that the TEA index indeed affects economic growth but that the influence depends on the level of economic development. In particular, the contribution to economic growth is found to be stronger for more highly developed countries, as compared to developing countries. The authors argue that this may be related to higher human capital levels of entrepreneurs in higher developed countries.
In the current paper we will perform a similar regression analysis but next to the general TEA index, we will also use the TEA high growth rate and the TEA medium growth rate as independent variables and compare their impact on economic growth with the impact of the general TEA index. The data and model used in this study are described below.
We use a sample of 36 countries participating in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) in 2002. Data on six basic variables are used in our model: total entrepreneurial activity (TEA), TEA medium growth, TEA high growth, growth of GDP, per capita income, and the growth competitiveness index (GCI). The sources and definitions of these variables are listed below.
Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA)
TEA is defined as the percentage of adult population that is either actively involved in starting a new venture or is the owner/manager of a business that is less than 42 months old.
The TEA high (medium) growth rate is defined as the percentage of adult population that is either actively involved in starting a new venture or is the owner/manager of a business that is less than 42 months old, and expects to employ 20 (6) employees or more within five years after the start of the firm. Data on total entrepreneurial activity are taken from the GEM Adult Population Survey for 2002.
Growth of GDP (∆GDP)
GDP growth rates are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook database of the
International Monetary Fund, version September 2005.

Per capita income (GNIC)
Gross national income per capita 2001 is expressed in (thousands of) purchasing power parities per US$, and these data are taken from the 2002 World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. (1) and (2). These equations are estimated separately by OLS. The hypothesis of a more positive effect for rich countries corresponds to coefficient b 1 (b 2 ) being larger than coefficient c 1 (c 2 ). Furthermore, the hypothesis that ambitious entrepreneurs contribute more to national economic growth than entrepreneurs in general corresponds to b 2 (c 2 ) being larger than b 1 (c 1 ).
Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI)
To illustrate the data at hand, Table 1 
Entrepreneurial growth ambitions and national economic growth
The results of our empirical exercises are in Tables 2-4. In Table 2 the regression results of   the impact of the general TEA index are presented (see Equation 1), while Tables 3 and 4 show the results using the TEA medium growth and TEA high growth rates as main independent variables (see Equation 2). Notes are as in Table 2 . Table 2 confirms earlier findings of Van Stel et al. (2005) that it is important to distinguish between different groups of countries. While for rich countries the impact of entrepreneurial activity is significantly positive, the impact for poor countries is effectively zero. 6 Furthermore, the three tables reveal three important results. First, as hypothesized, the presence of ambitious entrepreneurs indeed seems to be more important for achieving GDP growth than entrepreneurship in general. Comparing the coefficients of the various TEA rates across the tables, we see that in each of the three model variants the impact of TEA medium growth (growth ambition of 6 employees) is higher compared to the impact of TEA in general, while, in turn, the impact of TEA high growth (growth ambition of 20 employees) is still higher. For instance, for the group of highly developed countries in Model 3, the TEA rate has a coefficient of 0.11 (Table 2) , while the coefficients of the TEA medium and high growth are 0.26 and 0.29 (Tables 3 and 4) , respectively.
Second, having more entrepreneurs with high growth ambitions seems to be particularly important in transition countries. Both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient point at a stronger impact compared to highly developed or developing countries (see Tables 3 and 4 organizations. Fourth, those highly qualified (potential) entrepreneurs are also well connected to the power networks that were, and to a large extent still are important in the political and economic arena of these countries, which takes away some barriers for high growth firms in these countries. Summarizing, it may be argued that in transition economies high growth opportunities are more widely available and hence, a higher number of ambitious entrepreneurs willing to act on these opportunities may be particularly fruitful for achieving growth in these countries. However, we should be aware of the large diversity in the group of transition countries, which comprises countries like Russia and China, as well as Hungary and Slovenia.
Third, comparing the coefficients of the various TEA metrics over the three tables, it may be argued that it is important to have a substantial number of entrepreneurs with growth ambitions per se but that it is not so important whether these entrepreneurs expect to employ at least 6 employees or at least 20 employees. The differences between coefficients in Tables   3 and 4 are not that large. Also note that the model fit in Table 3 (TEA medium growth) is higher than that in Table 4 (TEA high growth). Especially in developed countries moderate growth entrepreneurs seem to be important. This might reflect the more mature industry structure in these countries, leaving more space for incremental innovations and moderate growth opportunities than the more dynamic high growth opportunities that can be found more often in transition countries.
Our regression results should be interpreted with some care as the analysis is based on a limited number of observations (36 countries).
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we investigated whether the presence of ambitious entrepreneurs is a more important determinant of national economic growth than entrepreneurial activity in general.
The results of our empirical exercises suggested that ambitious entrepreneurship contributes more strongly to macro-economic growth than entrepreneurial activity in general. We found a particularly strong effect of high-expectation entrepreneurship for transition countries. It would be naïve to recommend to focus policy completely on ambitious entrepreneurs and their (potentially) fast-growing firms. Economic growth is most likely achieved with a mix of small but high-growth firms and large, mature firms (Baumol 2002; Nooteboom 1994 ). On the one hand, the Netherlands, just like most European countries, has sufficient large firms, but seems to be lacking a sufficient number of high-growth new firms (see Bartelsman et al. 2005b ). On the other hand, our analyses show that rich and highly developed countries like the Netherlands may have more to gain (with respect to economic growth) with entrepreneurial activity in general, and perhaps a focus on moderately ambitious entrepreneurs, than with stimulating high growth entrepreneurs.
In this paper we assumed that the presence of ambitious entrepreneurs leads to economic growth via the successful development of their firms. Indeed, our empirical analysis does suggest that high-expectation entrepreneurs contribute more strongly to economic growth at the macro-level than entrepreneurs in general. This effect seems to be particularly strong in transition countries. However, we could not directly trace the assumed success at the micro-level of analysis. It would be worthwhile to follow the high potential startups to establish whether such firms fulfill their promised potential and what factors influence their subsequent success or failure. Such research would cast light on the nature of firm growth, including the characteristics of individuals involved, the effect of environmental factors and the long term developmental effects of these high potential start-ups. We should also be careful not to regard high ambitions as valuable in itself, as entrepreneurs may also be too ambitious in comparison with the financial resources that they have access to, which leads to a premature death of the new firm (Littunen 2000) . If the ambitions would turn out to be unrealistic it could even be the case that the overoptimistic entrepreneurs actually contribute negatively to macro-economic growth: social welfare would even be enhanced by discouraging entry into entrepreneurship (DeMeza 2002) . Understanding the transition from growth ambitions into growth realizations allows more effective policies to be drawn to encourage and stimulate entrepreneurial activities with growth potential. To this end more longitudinal research at the micro-level of analysis will be required.
Notes
1 The difficulty to predict the growth of start-ups has led the English DTI to emphasize entrepreneurs with growth aspirations in her competitiveness policy (DTI 1998). . The main rationale for this programme is the potential welfare gains to the economy which will result from enabling more new businesses with growth potential to achieve significant growth (see Smallbone et al. 2002) . There is an implicit assumption of market failure in the sense of the support needs of high-growth start-ups not being adequately met by the private sector.
The programme is also legitimated by its additionality to the existing start-up support. High growth potential of start-ups is defined as an aspiration of £1 million sales per annum. It is estimated that only about 1% of new business start-ups in the United Kingdom each year achieve annual sales of this amount. Achieving £150 000 sales within twelve months is provided as a stepping stone goal toward this threshold.
2 These figures relate to the percentage of firms within the population of medium-sized firms (50-1000 employees) that grow their business with at least 60% (in terms of employment) over a period of three years.
The figures relate to NACE codes C-K excluding J (sectors of economy) and to the period 1998-2001 (see Peeters and Verhoeven, 2005, p. 27) .
their business in the years to come. Hence, there may also be a (reversed) effect of economic growth on (high expectation) entrepreneurship. To limit the potential impact of reversed causality we include lagged GDP growth as an additional explanatory variable. We also measure TEA rates in a year (2002) preceding the period over which the dependent variable is measured (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . Still, the possibility of reversed effects cannot be ruled out completely. 6 Van Stel et al. (2005) refer to a possible lack of (foreign) larger companies in these poorer countries as a possible explanation for the zero effect of entrepreneurial activity. 7 In particular, results for Model 3 in Tables 2-4 might be sensitive to outliers. As a test of robustness we estimated Model 3 leaving out one country at a time, i.e. we computed 36 auxiliary regressions, where each regression uses 35 observations (each time leaving one of the 36 countries out). For TEA, using the full sample, we found a significant positive impact for the highly developed countries (see Table 2 ). In the auxiliary regressions we always found a positive impact for the highly developed countries which was significant at least at the 10% level, except for the regression excluding Korea. Here we found a coefficient of .088 and a t-value of 1.5. Similarly, for TEA medium growth, using the full sample, we found a significant positive impact for both the highly developed and the transition countries (see Table 3 ). In the auxiliary regressions we always found a significant positive impact for the highly developed countries except when Korea was excluded from the sample (coefficient .20; t-value 1.4). For the transition countries we always found a significant positive impact except when China was excluded from the sample (coefficient .56; t-value 1.4). Finally, for TEA high growth, using the full sample, we found a significant positive impact for the transition countries (see Table 4 ). In the auxiliary regressions we always found a significant positive impact, except when China (coefficient .76; t-value 1.2) or India (coefficient .60; t-value 1.4) were excluded. Note however that in all these cases, despite their insignificance, the estimated coefficients are close to the full sample estimates in Tables 2-4 . Furthermore, the Jarque-Bera test on the normality of disturbances is passed for all models reported in Tables 2-4. Therefore we feel that our results are quite robust to the potential influence of outliers.
